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Reforming local government: 
Must it always be democracy 
versus efficiency?
Aodh Quinlivan
Department of Government, University College Cork  
Abstract
The financial crisis from 2008 has had a profound impact on Irish local
government. Councils were faced with a disastrous combination of factors –
declining funding from central government, difficulties in collecting
commercial rates as businesses struggled, and a drastic fall in revenue from
development levies. Staffing levels in the local government sector were
reduced by over 20 per cent, significantly more than the losses suffered by
central government ministries and departments. Yet the financial crisis also
offered an opportunity for reform and a fundamental reappraisal of
subnational government in Ireland. A reform strategy produced in 2012 paved
the way for the Local Government Reform Act, 2014. As a result of this
legislation, the number of local authorities was reduced from 114 to 31 with
the complete abolition of all town councils. The number of council seats also
fell from 1,627 to 949. Using Scharpf’s dimensions of democratic legitimacy,
this article assesses whether the focus of the 2014 reforms was on output
legitimacy (efficiency and effectiveness) as opposed to input legitimacy
(citizen integration and participation). 
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Introduction
This year will see the most fundamental reform of local
government in over 100 years. (Taoiseach Enda Kenny, TD,
delivering the 15th Annual Philip Monahan Memorial Lecture in
University College Cork, and promoting the local government
reform agenda, 31 January 2014)
With this quote, the Taoiseach was referring to Putting People First:
Action Programme for Effective Local Government, which was
published in October 2012 by the Department of the Environment,
Community and Local Government. This policy document paved the
way for a bill which was published one year later. The legislation which
duly followed in 2014 did not follow normal practice in being titled a
‘local government act’. Rather, an extra word was inserted and the
legislation of 2014 became the Local Government Reform Act.
Reform can be a troublesome concept. The eighteenth-century
political theorist and philosopher Edmund Burke noted: ‘Change does
not equal reform. For change to be regarded as reform, it must result
in something better than before; it must result in an improvement.’ Of
course, local government reforms can take different trajectories
depending on the reasons for the changes being introduced. In
Ireland, as in many countries, the reforms were a response to the
financial crisis since 2008. The crisis, which started with the collapse of
overheated housing markets, ultimately undermined banks which had
been excessively generous in providing mortgages. The results were
failing banks and bailouts. This banking crisis had an enormous
negative impact on local government internationally (Local
Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, 2010):
• loss of dividends from banks partly owned by local governments,
such as Dexia and the Austrian Kommunalkredit (€52.7 million in
the case of Flemish communes);
• loss of reserves and devaluation of pension funds (fourteen Dutch
municipalities lost €85 million and British local authorities lost
over €1 billion in failing Icelandic banks);
• difficulty in obtaining or rolling over credit for investment
(particularly from previously active foreign lenders, such as the
Scandinavian banks in the Baltic states or Austrian banks in Central
and Eastern Europe);
• increased cost of servicing debt denominated in euros with
depreciating national currency.
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Irish local authorities were faced with a very challenging cocktail of
financial factors too – a decline in central government funding,
difficulties in collecting commercial rates because of struggling
businesses and the virtual disappearance of development levies due to
the collapse of the construction sector. Drastic measures were taken,
and local authority staffing decreased by 24 per cent in the five years
to 2013 and gross savings of €839 million were achieved in the same
period (Quinn, 2015, p. 13). 
The financial crisis accordingly provided the context for local
government policy at this time – including the Report of the Local
Government Efficiency Review Group (2010) and the reports of the
Local Government Efficiency Review Implementation Group (2012,
2013) – culminating in Putting People First and the Local Government
Reform Act, 2014. It also provided the backdrop to the general
election of 2011, where political reform was a dominant theme. 
This article aims to critically assess Irish local government policy
since the financial crisis, with a focus on the democratic dimension.
According to Kersting & Vetter (2003), local government reform
should be judged in terms of the maintenance of local democracy – in
other words, sustaining and strengthening local legitimacy. Scharpf
(1970, 1997, 1999) argues that there are two fundamental dimensions
to democratic legitimacy – input legitimacy and output legitimacy –
and both have to be taken into account when evaluating reform
strategies (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Dimensions of democratic legitimacy 
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY
Input Legitimacy Output Legitimacy
Citizen Integration/ Efficiency/Effectiveness
Participation
Source: Scharpf (1970, 1997, 1999).
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A discussion on input–output legitimacy can be tied to Dahl’s
(1994) concept of ‘democratic legitimacy’. He argued that a focus on
output can lead to a democratic deficit, while a focus on input can
lower the effectiveness of policymaking because inclusive decision-
making may be lengthy or individuals might not act in favour of the
common good (see Bevir, 2006; Börzel & Risse, 2005; Lieberherr,
2013). This conflict between input and output legitimacy can generate
conflict, although the concepts are not mutually exclusive. 
The hypothesis examined in this article is as follows: in the period
since the financial crisis, output pressures have outweighed input
pressures in Irish local government policy. 
Irish local government after the financial crisis
Ireland’s financial crisis has been written about extensively. The
impact of the crisis on the national budget cannot be overstated. As
highlighted by Turley & Flannery (2013, p. 42), the general
government balance, which had been in a surplus of 2.6 per cent in
2006, fell into a deficit of 7.3 per cent in 2008, 13.9 per cent in 2009 and
30.9 per cent in 2010. In addition, different sources of taxation
revenue, especially those relating to property, plunged dramatically.
Though the impact was not immediately felt in local authority budgets
in 2008, a sharp drop in local government finance soon followed.
Declining funding from central government and the virtual
disappearance of development levies meant that local authority
budgets ‘contracted substantially’ (Considine & Reidy, 2015, p. 131),
resulting in major expenditure reductions. Accordingly, the period
from 2008 has been a challenging one for the local government sector
and we have witnessed substantial change, if not reform. Callanan
(2016) details these changes using the headings of territorial,
functional, financial, managerial and efficiency, and participative
reforms. 
In 2008, when Ireland nosedived into recession, a Green Paper on
local government reform was published, entitled Stronger Local
Democracy: Options for Change. It contained some significant pro -
posals, with a focus on stronger democratic processes and improving
the balance of powers between management and elected
representatives. Though largely a consultation document, Stronger
Local Democracy included a useful and well-framed discussion on the
issue of introducing directly elected mayors to Ireland (see Callanan,
2008; Quinlivan, 2015). It favoured the introduction of a directly
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elected mayor not only in Dublin but across the other city and county
councils, and drew on examples from New Zealand, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and England. Additionally, the
Green Paper called for a greater devolution of local decisions from
county council to town council level, and it advocated an enhanced
role for people in local decision-making, including local plebiscites,
petition rights, participatory budgeting and town meetings
(Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government,
2008). While the Green Paper contained exciting ideas around local
government reform, its timing was bad due to the unfolding fiscal and
economic crisis. A White Paper was prepared in 2010 but it never saw
the light of day as local government reform dropped down the list of
government priorities. 
By 2010, expenditure consolidation was the priority and we saw the
publication of the Report of the Local Government Efficiency Review
Group. Predictably, it called for ‘a reduction in local government
staffing and reform of administration and financing’ (Quinn, 2015, p.
13) and it proposed over 100 recommendations. The follow-up reports
by the Local Government Efficiency Review Implementation Group
(2012, 2013) showed that the local government sector achieved
notable reductions in expenditure and staffing levels. There is some
dispute over the precise figure for the decline in staffing, with Quinn
(2015) claiming it was 24 per cent and Callanan (2016) stating it was
21 per cent. Whichever figure we take, it is worth noting that local
government suffered ‘the largest reduction in staff numbers across the
public sector, and compared to a 4 per cent fall in those working in
education and a 7 per cent fall in those working in central government
ministries and departments’ (Boyle, 2014). In line with national
decisions on public sector pay, local government staff also experienced
a decline in pay levels.
In the general election campaign of 2011, political reform was a
dominant theme and the subsequent programme for government
pledged ‘fundamental reorganisation of local governance structures’
(Government of Ireland, 2011). The focus on structure was borne out
in 2012 with the publication of the government’s action plan, bearing
the title Putting People First: Action Programme for Effective Local
Government. This plan called for the territorial reorganisation of local
government to achieve efficiencies and cost savings. In the foreword to
the document, the Minister for the Environment, Community and
Local Government, Phil Hogan, TD, outlined his vision as follows:
‘Local government structures in Ireland have not been updated since
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the 19th century. I am renewing those structures and introducing more
effective democratic arrangements, which will increase efficiency and
provide better value for money for the people it serves. This will
involve radical measures, such as a substantial reduction in the
number of councillors and the number of local and regional
authorities.’ 
To give effect to this vision, Minister Hogan proposed a reduction
in the number of local authorities from 114 to 31. This would involve
the complete abolition of all 80 town councils, reducing local
government to a single tier. The remaining 34 city and county councils
would be reduced by three due to mergers in Waterford, Limerick and
Tipperary. As part of this overhaul, the minister claimed that council
seats would fall from 1,627 to a maximum of 950. This proposal was
indeed radical, although it directly contradicted the 2008 Green Paper,
which promoted an enhanced role for town councils with devolution of
functions from county to town level. 
In proposing the abolition of the town councils, Minister Hogan
drew on the fact that the sub-county tier was neither consistent nor
comprehensive. The town councils existed only in specific areas,
covering a mere 14 per cent of the population. They also had few
major functional responsibilities since being stripped of water and
sanitary powers in 2001. Ultimately, Putting People First was just an
action plan but its main provisions became law two years later with the
passing of the Local Government Reform Act, 2014. While the
headline-grabbing dimension of the legislation was the drastic
reduction in the numbers of councils and councillors, there was much
more to the act than structural reform, as will be now discussed.
Functions 
Historically, local authorities in Ireland are responsible for a narrow
range of functions (see Callanan & MacCarthaigh, 2008; Collins &
Quinlivan, 2010; Loughlin, 2011). Putting People First spoke of
strengthening the role and functions of local councils but provided few
details. The Local Government Reform Act, 2014, did not generally
devolve powers from central to local government but it did give local
authorities a more overt role in economic development. Putting People
First argued that local government had ‘unique characteristics and a
strategic position that make it well placed to lead economic
development’ (Department of the Environment, Community and
Local Government, 2012, p. 21), and the 2014 legislation followed up
on this by stating that each local authority should establish a local
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community development committee (LCDC). In addition, each local
authority was given the responsibility to prepare a six-year local
economic and community plan, which would promote development in
its functional area. Local enterprise offices (LEOs) would also be
created to provide advice, information and support to people in
starting or growing their own businesses. In an effort to align local
government and local development activity, it was furthermore
decided that responsibility for the management of partnership
programmes, such as LEADER, would transfer to local councils and
the LCDCs. This move generated some controversy and it is not yet
clear how the alignment of development activity at local level will be
supported by a national framework. Quinn (2015, p. 17) commented,
‘The local-level reforms will only succeed if there is a whole-of-
government approach at national level to programme design, delivery
and evaluation.’ 
Another possible influence to the issue of local economic
development is the establishment of municipal districts under the 2014
Act. Following the abolition of the town councils and the holding of
local elections in 2014, ninety-five municipal districts came into being,
covering the entire area of each county and, for the most part,
corresponding to local electoral areas. 
Members of the county council elected from a local electoral area
become a member of the municipal district. The municipal districts
have the potential to provide a more balanced, comprehensive and
equitable system of representation within counties. The fundamental
problem, however, is that they are not councils and are not legitimate
local government corporate entities. There are no direct elections to
the municipal districts and they do not have revenue-raising
capabilities. As such, it can be argued that municipal districts are little
more than glorified area committees of the county councils.
Nonetheless, given that the municipal districts perform a range of
statutory functions in respect of their own districts, they offer the
potential to construct a new system of sub-county government due to
their strengths in terms of territorial balance. It can be argued that the
old town council model and the new municipal district model 
are mirror opposites in terms of their strengths and weaknesses (see
Table 1). 
Marrying the strengths of both systems – i.e. the comprehensive
territorial advantages of the municipal districts plus the democratic
legitimacy advantages of the town councils – could be an interesting
option in the future. This would involve establishing municipal district
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councils with direct elections. Such a development could enhance both
input and output legitimacy. A new tier of elected local government
close and accessible to the citizen would create participatory
opportunities in influencing local policymaking. Equally, on the
output side, there is no reason why properly resourced municipal
district councils could not deliver high-quality levels of service in a
cost-effective manner. After all, the town councils were the most
efficient element within the local government system in terms of being
self-financing and maintaining commercial rates at lower levels than
those of their county council counterparts (Quinlivan & Mehigan,
2011). 
Aside from an increased role in local economic development, there
was little else about functions in the Local Government Reform Act,
2014. However, one power was removed from councillors with the
elimination of the controversial Section 140 of the Local Government
Act, 2001. Councillors can now no longer direct the executive in
respect of planning decisions. The ending of Section 140 was a
recommendation of the Mahon Tribunal, which examined corruption
in planning processes. 
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Table 1: Comparison of the town council and municipal district
models 
Model Strengths Weaknesses
Town council Genuine tier of local Unbalanced, only covering
government with direct 14 per cent of the country
elections Too few powers
Ability to raise finance 
(rating authorities)
A focal point for 
communities – the town 
hall
Most self-financing part 
of the local government 
system
Municipal district Comprehensive and Not legitimate local 
balanced, covering the government units, as no
entire country direct elections
Linked to local No revenue-raising ability
electoral areas and Lack of powers
covering town and No public legitimacy
hinterland
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Under the subheading of ‘functions’, two other issues warrant brief
mention. Firstly, in 2014 the supply and treatment of water were
transferred from local councils to a national utility company, Irish
Water. Secondly, while there is a tendency to focus on the lack of
functions under the remit of local authorities, there have been
significant changes in how councils fulfil existing functions. After the
recommendations of the Local Government Efficiency Review Group
in 2010, we have seen changes to procurement systems, a reduction in
the use of consultants and an increasing number of shared-service
projects in areas such as HR, payroll, pensions and ICT (see Callanan,
2016; Quinn, 2015). For example, Laois County Council now operates
the payroll and superannuation functions for virtually all of the local
authorities. However, a key distinction has to be made between the
progress in terms of service-level and operational cooperation and the
lack of progress with regard to longer-term strategic cooperation in
areas such as planning. A recent document prepared by the
Department of Housing, Planning, Community and Local Govern -
ment (2017) notes: ‘Commitments to joint strategies have not been
honoured and joint committees to improve coordination have broken
down. Disputes about costs and standards of services have arisen in
relation to some inter-authority agreements. In some areas there has
been a serious lack of cooperation, including boundary disputes, and
conflicting policies and competition.’
Democratic participation
The Local Government Reform Act, 2014, failed to build on the ideas
contained in the 2008 Green Paper surrounding participative reforms
such as local plebiscites, participatory budgeting and petition rights.
However, there have been changes to facilitate greater civic
participation in local government. This has been achieved through the
establishment of public participation networks (PPNs). The PPNs –
replacing the existing community and voluntary fora – have been
created in each local authority to enable the public to take an active,
formal role in the policymaking and oversight responsibilities of the
council. There are now structures in place to ensure public
participation and representation on decision-making bodies within
local government, such as strategic policy committees. 
While input dimensions were neglected during Ireland’s post-2008
reforms, it would be incorrect to claim that they were entirely ignored.
Scharpf (1999) contends that input-side democratic legitimacy
requires mechanisms or procedures to link political decisions with
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citizens’ preferences. To some extent, it can be argued that elections
themselves are such mechanisms to the degree that they give people
influence in policymaking. The 2008 Green Paper – featuring input-
dimension proposals such as local plebiscites, participatory budgeting
and petition rights – never came to legislative fruition but a more
limited set of participatory processes was introduced. A Working
Group on Citizen Engagement with Local Government reported in
2014 and the government implemented its recommendation to
introduce PPNs at city/county and municipal district levels. Each PPN
should have:
• a city/county plenary which deals with issues at that level;
• a municipal district plenary in each municipal district which deals
with issues at that level;
• linkage groups dealing with specific issues;
• a secretariat at city/county level that is a facilitation and
communication mechanism.
It is too early to assess the impact of PPNs across the country but there
is a hope that they will improve public participation in local
government decision-making. While accepting that many consultation
processes of local authorities are required by law, it is also the case
that some local authorities are leading the way in terms of innovative
participation mechanisms. As noted by Callanan & MacCarthaigh
(2008), ‘most local councils have youth councils to give a voice to
young people in their area and make recommendations to the local
council, and an increasing number have established a similar forum for
older persons’ (see Callanan, 2016). The local authorities played a
central role in founding the Irish Age Friendly Cities and Counties
programme (an adaptation of the World Health Organisation’s Age
Friendly Cities and Communities model). In addition, before and after
2008, local authorities have steadfastly increased their role in areas
such as social inclusion, adult literacy, childcare and lifelong learning. 
As Callanan & MacCarthaigh (2008) rightly point out, local
government has been to the forefront in using online platforms, social
media and customer panels, as well as traditional calls for written
submissions to development plans and other proposals. One area
where members of the public are entitled to make submissions to the
local authority is in relation to the annual Local Property Tax (LPT).
The LPT broadens the revenue base of councils and it has been
described as ‘an important but minor victory for local government in
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Ireland’ (Considine & Reidy, 2015, p. 141). Introduced in 2013, the
LPT initially was anything but a local tax for councils, as the money
was retained by central government. However, from 2015, councils
have been able to retain 80 per cent of the revenues generated, with
the balance held centrally for the purpose of equalisation. Local
authorities have the power to vary the LPT annually by a maximum of
15 per cent. 
One reform proposal in the 2014 Act that should have led to
democratic participation through a local plebiscite was the
introduction of a directly elected mayor for the Dublin Metropolitan
Area. The legislation proposed the holding of a Dublin plebiscite to
coincide with the local elections on 23 May 2014. Controversially, the
2014 Act contained a provision that each of the four local authorities
constituting the Dublin Metropolitan Area would firstly have to
individually adopt a resolution in favour of holding the plebiscite (see
Quinlivan, 2015). Three of the four authorities – Dublin City Council,
South Dublin County Council and Dún Laoghaire–Rathdown County
Council – comfortably adopted resolutions in favour of the plebiscite.
Crucially, Fingal County Council voted against by sixteen votes to six.
The Fingal veto meant that the proposal died and did not go before
the people of Dublin on 23 May as planned, despite the fact that the
combined vote across the councillors from all four authorities was
98–19 in favour. There was merit to the concerns expressed by
members of Fingal County Council who voted down the proposal,
principally the justifiable complaint that the 2014 Act did not provide
enough detail about the role and powers of the mayor, and so people
would not know precisely what they were voting on. Despite this
setback it seems only a matter of time before the issue of a directly
elected mayor for Dublin returns to the agenda of central government. 
Though the mayoral proposal fell by the wayside, the Local
Government Reform Act, 2014, did introduce changes in relation to
executive management. The Irish local government system has
traditionally operated a corporate model with the county/city manager
accountable to the elected councillors, who in turn are answerable to
the people at election time. 
In theory, this equates to the relationships between a CEO
(city/county manager), a board of directors (elected councillors) and
the shareholders (electorate). Under the 2014 legislation, the title of
city or county manager was replaced by CEO, reinforcing the
corporate model. 
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The principal change introduced in 2014 was in relation to the
appointment of the CEO. Traditionally in Irish local government, the
elected members formally appointed the city/county manager but they
were obliged to do so, i.e. the legislation stated that the council shall
appoint the candidate recommended by the Public Appointments
Service. However, under the 2014 Act, councillors have been given
veto powers. Within three months of having received a recommenda -
tion from the Public Appointments Service, the council must meet and
decide to appoint or not appoint the person recommended. If the
council decides not to approve the appointment, reasons for such a
decision must be furnished to the recommended person. It will be
interesting to see if bringing the appointment of the CEO into the
political arena becomes an issue for local authorities in the future. 
Discussion
Undoubtedly, the period since 2008 has brought major changes to the
Irish local government landscape, some of which have been described
above. An entire tier of local government and 83 councils in total have
been removed. The number of councillors has been reduced by over 40
per cent. Councils have lost more than 20 per cent of their staff and
budgets have been decimated. Water functions have been transferred
upwards from local authorities to a central utility company. The LPT
has been introduced as a source of revenue for councils. Municipal
districts have been created. Local government has an enhanced role in
economic development. LCDCs and LEOs have been formed. PPNs
are there to ensure involvement of citizens in local decision-making.
City and county managers are now CEOs. Councillors can veto the
appointment of a CEO. The issue of a directly elected mayor for
Dublin was raised and defeated, but it will come again. Significant cost
savings and efficiencies have been achieved. New ways of working
have been found, including a shared services approach to back-office
services. 
What does it all mean? Is Irish local government better than it was
in 2008, before the financial crisis? Has the system been reformed?
Quinn (2015, p. 7) argues that our approach to local government
reform has been reactive rather than proactive, and concludes: ‘There
is little evidence of a clear and consistent philosophy underpinning
reform, so the cumulative changes represent a unique blend of
innovation, incrementalism and entrenchment’. Rhodes & Boyle
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(2012, p. 40) assert that ‘reforms targeting local government have
resulted in very little devolved authority or capacity in local
government’. The conclusion by the Council of Europe’s Congress of
Local and Regional Authorities (2013), following their 2013 visit to
Ireland, was that the system remains intensely centralised. The group’s
commentary on Putting People First was especially damning: ‘The new
policy paper [Putting People First], although it praises decentralisation
in spirit, does not appear to provide many concrete steps in that
direction. Some of the actual steps proposed go in the opposite
direction.’ 
An economic crisis accompanied by fiscal restraints and dramatic
reductions in local government budgets invariably leads to a
concentration on territorial and functional reforms (e.g. boundary
changes and amalgamations) and a neglect of democratic dimensions
of reform. This was certainly the case in Ireland post 2008 and the tone
struck by the Local Government Efficiency Review Group (2010) was
carried into Putting People First and the Local Government Reform
Act, 2014. The main manifestation of this were the structural and
territorial changes introduced with the abolition of 80 town councils
and the mergers of two authorities in Waterford, Limerick and
Tipperary. By any standards, a 73 per cent reduction in the number of
local authorities from 114 to 31 was a drastic measure. With 114 local
authorities, Ireland already possessed, from a comparative
perspective, fewer local authorities than most countries in Europe and
had very high citizen-to-council and citizen-to-councillor ratios. With
just 31 councils, an even greater distance has been created between the
citizen and the local council. The predictable rationale for the
structural changes involved economies of scale and cost savings but
the international research evidence suggests that large-scale
authorities do not necessarily produce efficiencies and savings (see
Byrnes & Dollery, 2002; Callanan et al., 2014). Once local government
stops being local, a democratic deficit is created and the evidence
shows that citizen satisfaction with local services tends to be higher in
smaller local authorities. Currently, the government is considering
more local government amalgamations in Cork and Galway, which
could reduce the number of councils still further to 29. It may only be
a matter of time before smaller county councils are amalgamated to
sustain the ‘big is beautiful’ narrative. Interestingly, enhanced local
government strategic cooperation may emerge as an alternative to
amalgamations or boundary revisions. The report by the Carlow
Boundary Review Committee (2016) concluded that the high level of
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cooperation between the two councils (Carlow and Laois) at both
operational and strategic levels made a boundary extension or any
other reconfiguration unnecessary. 
The trend towards fewer and larger local authorities is not
irreversible. The leader of the Labour Party, Brendan Howlin, TD, a
senior member of cabinet in the coalition government from 2011 to
2016, has described the abolition of town councils as a major mistake
and has called for their reinstatement. In February 2017 the leader of
Fianna Fáil, Micheál Martin, TD, outlined his party’s policy for local
government reform and argued that the ‘bigger is better’ philosophy
was not the way forward, stating, ‘dispersing power to the appropriate
level of governance from supranational bodies such as the EU down to
the lowest tier of government is critical to ensuring that people are not
isolated from the decisions that shape their lives’.1 Martin has
proposed the reshaping of Irish local government and recommends
the creation of a commission to establish a new town council structure
together with community councils. 
As discussed previously, a ready-made structure is potentially in
place at sub-county level with the 95 municipal districts. These could
become municipal district councils with direct elections, revenue-
raising powers and devolved functions. To make this a reality, there
would need to be a significant shift in central–local relations and a
departure from the centralised thinking which has been endemic since
the foundation of the state in 1922. For example, while local
government is recognised in Bunreacht na hÉireann (Irish Constitu -
tion), it is not protected. In 2013 the government proposed the
abolition of Seanad Éireann (Irish Senate) but it could not proceed
without the approval of the Irish people by way of referendum as the
Seanad is protected in the constitution. This is the not the case for
local government, and the abolition of 83 local authorities in 2014
happened without the need for a referendum. 
The hypothesis put forward at the beginning of this article was as
follows: in the period since the financial crisis, output pressures have
outweighed input pressures in Irish local government policy. This
flows from Scharpf’s two dimensions of democratic legitimacy. The
input and output dimensions are consistent with the belief that local
government essentially exists for two reasons. The first is for the
efficient delivery of public services locally (output legitimacy). The
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second is as a bulwark of democracy and a safeguard against central
government domination (input legitimacy). Equally, these can be
described as the economic model of local government and the political
model of local government. Scharpf (1970, 1999) argues that
democratic legitimacy is a two-dimensional concept which refers to
both the inputs and outputs of a political system. The two dimensions
are not mutually exclusive, i.e. you can have democratically strong and
efficient local government. 
There is little doubt, as described in this article, that output
considerations dominated local government policy considerations in
the years following the financial crisis. Understandably, given the
serious state of the country’s economy and the commitments given as
part of the EU/IMF Programme of Financial Support for Ireland, the
government concentrated on expenditure consolidation, cost savings,
value for money and efficiency. The abolition of the town councils, in
conjunction with the other amalgamations, was premised on the belief
that it would result in a cost saving of €420 million. 
Combined with the reduction in the number of councillors and
staff, as well as cost savings through shared-service projects and other
measures, the local government sector surpassed the recommenda -
tions of the Local Government Efficiency Review Group (2010).
Loughlin’s (2011, p. 66) conclusion that ‘the democratic dimension of
Irish local government has been strongly over-ridden by its
administrative dimension’ supports the hypothesis. Kersting & Vetter
(2003, p. 333) claim that there is a tendency for local government
reforms to be ‘dominated by a business and management-oriented
terminology, while the questions of citizen participation, integration
and democratic responsiveness are often neglected’. Drawing on
Scharpf’s work, they argue that this is logical given that input
deficiencies generally do not imply the same stress for local and
national decision-makers as that implied by financial constraints. 
Conclusion
This article concludes that since the financial crisis that commenced in
2008, Irish local authorities have made great strides to become more
efficient and cost-effective (output legitimacy). However, efforts with
regard to citizen integration and participation have not been as
impressive or consistent. Local government policy, as dictated by
central government, has missed an opportunity by focusing on
efficiency over democracy rather than trying to reform both
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dimensions simultaneously. Pierre (1990, p. 38) expresses the difficulty
faced by many governments during recessionary times: ‘On the one
hand, local governments are to act as the vehicle of local democracy,
providing services responsive to local needs and conditions. On the
other hand, local governments must constitute the local branch of the
nation-state administrative apparatus, executing state policies in key
policy areas. Here, bureaucratic efficiency is the key objective.’ It is
hoped that, having achieved much on the output side during the initial
phase of reform, attention will now be focused on the input side during
the next phase of reform. Most of the weaknesses that were evident in
the Irish local government system prior to 2008 remain, e.g. lack of
constitutional protection, centralism, narrow functional base, lack of
administrative and financial autonomy. We have taken a few tentative
steps on the way to local government reform but there is a long road
to travel.
The spirit of democracy is not a mechanical thing to be adjusted
by abolition of forms. It requires change of heart. 
(Mahatma Gandhi)
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